Posted on April 8th 1988
Divestment Wrong
By Alex Linder
[ The following is from a forum thread posting. ]
[opinion published in Pomona College's The Student Life, Friday, April 8, 1988]
Divestment Wrong
By Alex Linder
Over the last four years it is fair to say that the question of divesting from South Africa has been the biggest and hardest fought issue at Pomona. Although Pomona itself did not divest, it was pressure of the type found on our campus that was instrumental in forcing Reagan to impose sanctions against that country. Now -- a year and a half later -- it is interesting and instructive to look at the change, if any, those sanctions have brought about.
First, consider the course American policy followed under Reagan up through around 1985. Chester Crocker developed a policy called constructive engagement by which America could use her admittedly minor political influence to encourage South Africa to promote political progress through the expansion of individual rights to minorities. Further, American companies employing South Africans would be encouraged to sign the Sullivan Principles, guaranteeing they would treat their white and black employees equally.
Around 1984, the political pressure for sanctions and divestment began to grow. Although there was little actual change in the internal conditions in South Africa, in the wake of America's economic upturn and decommunization of Grenada, American liberals needed something to attack Reagan with. Hence, sanctions.
Surely, it seemed, sanctions was an issue we could all agree on. Is not South Africa's a racist government? Do not we Americans support, however indirectly, this racism by allowing companies to invest there? Finally, on purely utilitarian grounds, is it not wiser to go along with the wishes of those who will inevitably take power - the black majority? Those favoring action against South Africa answered the questions this way: 1) South Africa has a racist government, thus we must try to get rid of it. 2) Doing business, even through firms that have signed the Sullivan Principles, shows support (through taxes, etc.) for the racism that is South Africa's hallmark. 3) The majority of black South Africans favor sanctions, and to be moral we must go along with what they want. Conclusion: We must try to get as many nations as possible to declare sanctions against South Africa.
Which brings us back to the initial question, now slightly refined: Have the sanctions declared on South Africa changed the sitaution for the better? ("Better" is here defined as more democratic.) In a word: No. To understand why not, we must look at what people expected sanctions would do. First, many people thought that sanctions would put enough pressure on the ruling white elite to force them to change their ways, i.e., enfranchise blacks and other racial minorities. Second, some hoped that sanctions would hurt blacks so much that they would rise up and overthrow the whites. Thirdly, many in favor of sanctions just wanted to do what they felt to be morally correct.
Regarding the first rationale, it is clear that sanctions have failed. Listen to the words of Stoffel van der Merwe, the deputy minister of information and constitutional planning and a leading reformer within the National Party: "Sanctions have not hurt our ability to survive, but they have limited our ability to do reform," (L.A. Times, March 13). Van der Merwe also said taht sanctions had slowed the pace of reform by "engendering a major backlash against any progressive measure." The economic statistics bear him out. In 1987 South Africa had a $3 billion surplus in its balance of payments; her gold holdings and foreign reserves have doubled from 1985; her economic growth rate has gone from a modest decline (-1.5%) in 1985 to 2.6 percent in 1987 and continues to rise. Thus, the effects of sanctions were relatively weak. South Africa simply shifted her trade to Japan and other Asian countries away from the U.S. and Europe. Although the calling back of short-term loans by some Western banks did result in increased unemployment and general economic slowdown, South Africa has by most measures rebounded.
Regarding the second motive, it is equally clear that this has failed. Blacks have not risen up and overthrown the whites. The much-heralded revolution is hardly imminent; if anything the situation is less heated and emotional than three years ago. And, as previously stated, the South African economy is growing, not declining.
It is the third motive, the question of being morally correct that is most interesting. Having answered the question of the effects of sanctions from the world in general, let us examine the effects of the American sanctions.
Listen to Fleur de Villiers, former associate editor of the Johannesburg Sunday Times: "Of the nearly 170 U.S. companies that have quit South Africa in the last few years, more than half have sold out -- at firesale prices -- to South African companies or local managements, thus creating some 100 new instant millionaires, all of them white." Further, de Villiers points out, under new South African ownership, many of these firms abandoned the costly measures required them as signatories of the Sullivan Principles and fired their black employees. Black South Africans also suffered because more government money had to be spent on developing oil and arms reserves in response to sanctions.
Perhaps the most insidious victory of the pro-sanctions crowd has been their successful convincing of the average American (or college student at least) that sanctions are what the blacks in South Africa want. (Their wishes, it is commonly accepted, deciding which course is moral for America to take.) In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The blacks in South Africa who favor sanctions are the hierarchies of the unions as well as those perceived by Western media as leaders (i.e., Bishop Tutu). Poll after poll has found, however, that when the average workers are asked, only 25 percent favor sanctions if it means they will undergo hardship. The people who favor sanctions are the ones who are not affected -- people like you and me and Tutu.
So here we are. When I last wrote about sanctions (fall semester 86/87) I said that we would be where indeed we are today: After having imposed sanctions and finding South Africa still non-democratic, facing the question of renewing sanctions or choosing another path. Clearly, we must side with the average working black South African and eschew sanctions, focusing instead on rebuilding economic leverage with an eye toward encouraging the evolution of South Africa into a more perfect democracy with respect for individual rights.
Finally, a point about demonstrations in general. It's wrong to get involved with things you do not understand. A couple hours out of your Friday afternoon may not be much to you, but to that black South African with six dependents, Ford's divestment may be a matter of life and death.//